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Evaluating Our Evaluations
Recognizing and Countering
Performance Evaluation Pitfalls
Lt. Col. Lee A. Evans, PhD, U.S. Army
Lt. Col. G. Lee Robinson, PhD, U.S. Army

S

electing the right person for the right job at the
right time is a persistent challenge faced by organizations. Performance evaluations are a fundamental component of selection processes, and their use
in the Army is nearly as old as the service itself. Some
early evaluation systems consisted of a list of officers in
a regiment with observations noted for each ranging
from “a good-natured man” to “merely good—nothing
promising” to “a man of whom all unite in speaking ill.”1
While our current evaluation form adds a bit more
science to the art of performance evaluation, a constant
in the Army’s performance evaluation system is the reliance on raters to render their judgment on the potential
of a subordinate for service at higher levels.
Raters need to be better equipped to exercise these
judgments. While we recognize the calls for personnel
management reform and the initiatives underway to better manage the Army’s talent, our purpose is not to add
another voice to these suggestions for structural changes
to the Army’s evaluation system.2 Instead, we focus on
the process of discretionary judgment exercised by raters
that is and will continue to be an integral part of performance evaluation. Our aim is to recognize the structural
and cognitive biases inherent in our evaluation system
and provide recommendations to help senior raters more
objectively evaluate their subordinates.
While we think the importance of this topic is
self-evident, educating raters on the potential for bias
in their evaluations is especially important in the type
of rating system used by the Army. This system places
great emphasis on the person serving as the senior
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rater. Although the evaluation forms include assessments from raters and sometimes intermediate raters,
the senior rater comments are widely acknowledged
to carry the most weight for promotion and selection
decisions due to the small amount of time available to
evaluate a soldier’s file.3 Most positions involve work
that is highly interdependent on other members of the
organization, which places a considerable demand on
raters to assess and articulate how much an individual
contributed to the output of the group.4
While the performance of an officer is undoubtedly
important to his or her chances for promotion or selection, the abilities of the officer’s senior rater to convey the
level of this performance through an evaluation is also
vital to talent management. Previous studies demonstrate that exposure to a high-quality mentor increases
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an officer’s likelihood of an early promotion to major
by 29 percent, perhaps because high-quality mentors
are skilled at communicating their protégé’s potential
in their performance evaluations.5 Equipping raters to
make their best possible judgments of subordinates and
clearly articulating these judgments is vital to fostering a
meritocratic Army talent management system.

Evaluating the Performance
Evaluation Tool: Structural Biases in
the Department of the Army Form 67
In 1922, the Army introduced a formalized performance appraisal system, the War Department Adjutant
General's Office (WD AGO) Form 711, Efficiency Report,
rebranded two years later as the WD AGO Form 67,
to assess officers in the domains of physical qualities,
intelligence, leadership, personal qualities, and general
value to the service.6 Since 1922, the Army modified DA
Form 67 ten times; the most recent iteration was the DA
Form 67-10 series (hereafter referred to collectively as
DA Form 67-10).7 Each iteration of the officer evaluation form contained nuanced approaches to segment the
population in order to accurately represent the spectrum
of officer performances from the highest performing officers to those who should not be retained in the service.
DA Form 67-10 uses a forced distribution technique
where senior raters of lieutenant colonels and below can
award “most qualified” evaluations to fewer than half of
their subordinates. (For comparison, an example of the
1934 efficiency report format is shown on pages 94–95
to highlight the perennial challenges the Army has faced
over time in capturing and expressing an effective and
fair means of comparing the performances of officers.)
Forced distribution rating systems have been common
in the Department of Defense and the civilian sector
because of the problem of appraisal distortion in the
absence of forced distribution.8 For example, prior to implementing a forced distribution performance appraisal
system, the U.S. Navy saw the majority of its officers
rated in the top 1 percent.9 In theory, forced distribution
decreases ratings inflation and provides the means for a
variety of human resources decisions, including promotion, training, and assignment of personnel.
However, even under a best-case scenario (with the
absence of cognitive biases), system structure induces
error in a forced distribution performance appraisal
system. Allan Mohrman alluded to this problem in his
90

argument that forced distribution systems should be
applied to large enough groups of employees, specifically
over fifty.10 While he failed to provide mathematical
support for this number, his argument relies on the
statistical qualities of large sample sizes. For example,
if a reasonably large sample, typically n > 30, is drawn
from a population with a normal distribution, the sample mean and the standard deviation of the sample are
nearly indistinguishable from that of the population.11
In the context of officer performance and potential, assuming both are normally distributed, this suggests that
larger samples of officers will provide a more accurate
representation of performance levels across the force.
While larger samples are typically a good representation
of performance level distribution, they are in direct conflict with the concept of pooling introduced by Army
Regulation (AR) 623-3, Evaluation Reporting System.
AR 623-3 defines pooling as “elevating the rating
chain beyond the senior rater’s ability to have adequate
knowledge of each Soldier’s performance and potential,
in order to provide an elevated assessment protection for
a specific group.”12 The word “pooling” appears more than
ten times in the most recent version of AR 623-3, which
states that pooling runs counter to the intent of the
evaluation system and erodes soldiers’ confidence in the
fairness and impartiality of their leaders.13
Creating a rating scheme that minimizes the number
of subordinates under each rater ideally allows raters to
have an intimate knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the soldiers they rate. The idea of an organizational structure that limits the number of subordinates
under a rater’s span of control is also a common practice
in the civilian sector. The manager-to-employee ratio
across industries worldwide is approximately 1:4 for companies with five hundred or fewer employees and 1:9 for
companies with greater than five hundred employees.14
While there are many sound reasons that the Army
seeks to decrease a rater’s span of control, an often overlooked downside of this practice is the presence of errors
resulting from a forced distribution system, especially
in small rating pools. According to AR 623-3, a senior
rater should award “most qualified” evaluations to the top
one-third of officers, and the number of “most qualified”
evaluations they award must be less than 50 percent of
the total number of evaluations he or she writes.
With a few simplifying assumptions, such as
officers distributed randomly into rating pools of five
January-February 2020
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and the raters having perfect clarity on whether a
subordinate is a top one-third officer, the hypergeometric distribution (as explained below) provides
insight into the mathematical pitfalls of a forced
distribution performance appraisal system.
The hypergeometric distribution has three parameters: N, R, and n. The parameter N represents the number of items in the population, R represents the number

at least one rated officer will receive an inaccurate
evaluation due to the rater’s profile constraint. We can
calculate this expected annual error with E[Annual
Error]. Notationally, for a rating pool of five officers,
(i – 2)
this is represented by E[Annual Error] =
P(X = i) = P(X = 3) + 2P(X = 4) + 3P(X = 5). That is,
when there are three top one-third officers in a rating
pool of five, one officer is adversely affected by the

Creating a rating scheme that minimizes the number of
subordinates under each rater ideally allows raters to
have an intimate knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the soldiers they rate.
of “successes,” and n is the sample size drawn from the
population. Using this nomenclature, we can determine
that the random variable is X~Hypergeometric(N, R, n)
and calculate the probability that X (in our case, the
number of “most qualified” officers in a rating pool)
takes on particular, discrete values.
For example, if there are five thousand officers of
a particular rank, 1,667 of them would be considered the top one-third based on established criteria.
We can calculate the probability of receiving exactly x top one-third officers in a group of n size. If
we assume a pool size of five officers, we would use
X~Hypergeometric(5000, 1667, 5) to calculate the
probability that we receive exactly x top one-third
officers in our rating pool, notationally P(X = x). That
is, P(X = 2) represents the probability that exactly two
top one-third officers were assigned to a rating pool
of five. In fact, P(X = 2) = 0.329, meaning there is a
32.9 percent chance that there would be exactly two
top one-third officers in a rating pool of five, assuming
officers are randomly distributed into ratings pools.
Thus, given the current profile constraint of less than
50 percent, raters could only award two “most qualified” evaluations to a pool of five officers.
The rater’s ability to discern the two top one-third
performers is affected by cognitive biases, but mathematically, the rater may be obligated to award an
evaluation that is not commensurate with a subordinate’s level of performance due to forced distribution
requirements. For example, if a rater has a pool size of
five, but has more than two top one-third performers,
MILITARY REVIEW
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profile constraint. When there are four top one-third
officers, two officers are affected by the profile constraint. When all five officers are top one-third officers,
three officers are affected by the profile constraint.
An E[Annual Error] = 0.259 means that for each
rating pool of five officers, 0.259 (or about one officer
per rating pool every four years) would not receive the
top evaluation they deserved. If five thousand officers
are randomly placed into pools of five, even under
conditions of perfect clarity of the rater to discern
performance level and follow the guidance in AR 623-3
to reserve “most qualified” evaluations for the top onethird officers, we would expect that 259 officers per
year do not receive the evaluation they deserve.

Addressing Structural Biases
We suggest three ways to counter structural biases.
First, senior raters should follow the guidance in AR
623-3 and reserve “most qualified” evaluations for the
top one-third officers. This requires a discerning eye,
and as previously mentioned, will result in an expected
annual error of about one officer per rating pool every
four years for a rating pool of five officers. According to
the U.S. Army Human Resources Command, “the limitation of less than 50% translates to an average use of
37–42% depending on the grade (of the rated officer).”15
Within this relatively small range, there is a significant
difference in the expected annual error.
If a senior rater uses the top 37 percent of officers
as the cutoff for most “qualified” evaluations, it would
result in an expected annual error of 0.340 whereas a 42
91
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Figure 1. Expected Annual Error as a Function of a Senior
Rater’s “Most Qualified” Threshold

percent threshold increases the expected annual error
to 0.469. As seen in figure 1, higher thresholds for what
percentage of officers should receive a “most qualified”
evaluation result in monotonically higher than expected
annual errors. However, senior raters who place these
thresholds below those of other raters disadvantage some
of their subordinates who would have received “most
qualified” evaluations in other rating pools. Therefore, a
senior rater would want to award a similar percentage of
“most qualified” evaluations as other senior raters across
the Army to ensure his or her subordinates are not disadvantaged but low enough to prevent instances where
the number of “most qualified” officers within their
rating pools exceeds the profile constraint.
Second, we recommend senior raters have a
multiyear focus and refrain from maximizing the
number of “most qualified” evaluations awarded each
year. The U.S. Human Resources Command stated
that the 37–42 percent use of “most qualified” evaluations by senior raters is “indicative of senior raters
correctly retaining a buffer.”16 This guidance assumes
that anything less than 50 percent constitutes a
buffer. However, figure 2 (on page 93) shows that the
92

maximum allowable percentage of “most qualified”
evaluations does not remain above 42 percent until
a senior rater completes twenty-five evaluations. For
example, if a senior rater completes eight evaluations,
at most, three of them can be “most qualified” evaluations, putting the senior rater profile usage at 37.5
percent. If the senior rater kept a buffer of just one
evaluation, the profile usage drops to 25 percent.
Maximizing the number of “most qualified” evaluations awarded often results in either a Type I or Type
II error. In the context of performance appraisals, a
Type I error is incorrectly identifying an officer as
most qualified, whereas Type II error is not identifying a most qualified officer as such. If a senior rater
has a rating pool of five officers and is predetermined
to award the maximum of two top evaluations, there
is only a 34.6 percent chance that there are exactly
two top 40 percent officers in a pool of randomly distributed officers. There is a 33.7 percent chance that
there are fewer than two top 40 percent officers, leading to a Type I error, and a 31.7 percent chance there
are more than two top 40 percent officers, leading to
a Type II error. A senior rater’s profile constraint can
January-February 2020
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Maximum allowable percent of
most-qualified evaluations

induce a Type II error, but a Type I error is caused by
Third, consistent with AR 623-3, we recommend
either cognitive biases or conscious decisions.
that senior raters structure rating schemes to provide
A conscious decision to award a “most qualified”
flexibility to reward the best subordinates. When disevaluation to an undeserving officer can have comcussing the establishment of rating chains, AR 623-3
pounding effects
60
since rating profiles
are cumulative. We
analyze this effect by
50
calculating the expected two-year error. If
40
a senior rater plans to
maximize the number
of “most qualified”
30
Maximum
evaluations awarded,
presumably off of a
20
Buffer of one
top 40 percent standard, it will result in
10
an expected annual
error of 0.415 and an
expected two-year er0
ror of 0.830 for a pool
10
15
20
25
30
0
5
size of five. However,
if a senior rater can
Number of rated subordinates
use the top one-third
standard for award(Figure by authors)
ing “most qualified”
evaluations, there will
Figure 2. Profile Usage for Senior Raters Who Maximize
be an expected annual
Their “Most Qualified” Evaluations and Those Who
error of 0.259 and an
Keep a Buffer of One
expected two-year
error of 0.416.
The reason that
provides general guidance, such as commanders rating
the expected two-year error is not double that of the
commanders, and prohibits the practice of pooling.
expected annual error is that if there is only one top
However, it gives organizations the latitude to estabone-third officer in the rating pool the first year, the
lish and publish their rating scheme at the beginning
senior rater can award up to three “most qualified”
of each period. While the recommended size of rating
evaluations the second year. Similarly, if there are no
pools cannot be generalized across nonhomogeneous
top one-third officers in the rating pool the first year,
units, organizations should establish rating chains that
a senior rater can award up to four “most qualified”
do not disadvantage officers at each grade level.
evaluations the second year. In summary, by resisting
For example, increasing our sample rating pool of
the urge to award the maximum allowable number of
five officers to ten officers decreases both the expected
top evaluations each year and maintaining a top oneannual error and the expected annual two-year error.
third standard, senior raters can reduce Type II errors
As previously stated, using the criteria of top one-third
by nearly 50 percent. Consequently, coaching officers
officers deserving “most qualified” evaluations, the
to have a multiyear focus is especially important since
expected annual error for a pool size of five is 0.259 and
recent research shows how an officer’s seniority affects
17
the expected two-year error is 0.416. Doubling the size
the evaluations they receive in the evaluation process.
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(Form published in Technical Manual 12-250, Administration, 10 February 1942)

Sample of U.S. Army Efficiency Report from 1936
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(Form published in Technical Manual 12-250, Administration, 10 February 1942)

Sample of U.S. Army Efficiency Report from 1936 (continued)
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of the rating pool to ten officers while maintaining the
top one-third most qualified officer threshold drops
the expected two-year error to 0.364. Since the expected two-year error is for two years of officers in a pool
size of ten, we can compare it to the expected two-year

of cognitive bias can make a difference in the identification and selection of officers with the greatest
potential for service at higher levels.19 Stated differently, the more bias we can divest from evaluations,
the better positioned selection boards will be to make

The more bias we can divest from evaluations, the
better positioned selection boards will be to make
the difficult choices inherent in talent management of
a large pool of candidates.
error for a pool size of five by dividing by two. Doubling
the rating pool size from five to ten thus results in a 56
percent decrease in Type II errors.

Evaluating the Evaluator:
Cognitive Biases
As evidenced in the previous section, there are
structural biases introduced by the DA Form 67-10 that
make it difficult for raters to consistently reward the best
officers. In addition to these structural biases, because of
the discretionary nature of performance evaluation, there
are also cognitive biases that may affect the judgment of
senior raters. We focus on five cognitive biases that may
lead to a difference between the performance of an officer
and how this performance translates to the potential
described by a senior rater in an evaluation report.
A cognitive bias occurs when a rater unknowingly
renders judgments that are unrelated to an officer’s
performance. Because raters have great discretion
in how they articulate the potential of an officer in
an evaluation, cognitive biases have the potential to
influence the enthusiasm they use to describe a soldier
in the narrative portion of the report.
These choices are especially important because
there is likely a small talent differential between officers just above and just below the cutline in promotion and selection boards. There is anecdotal evidence
to support this point from officers who served on
promotion boards, but we also see empirical support
for small differences between primary and alternate
selectees in other fields.18 Since selection boards have
little time to review files and consider a relatively
minimal amount of information, reducing the effects
96

the difficult choices inherent in talent management of
a large pool of candidates.
A key point on cognitive bias is that it is unintentional. Evaluating a person’s performance is undoubtedly complex. How much of performance is due to a
person’s talent versus the interactive effects from the
group? And how does their performance compare to
their peers who faced similar tasks but did so under different conditions with different teammates?
Psychologist Daniel Kahneman shaped much of
what we understand about complex decision-making
with his insights on System 1 and System 2 thinking.
System 1 thinking normally guides our decisions as it
operates automatically and enables us to make most
decisions with little or no effort. When faced with
more complex tasks, System 2 thinking enables us to
focus our attention on more complex computations.
While we like to think we can put System 2 in control
when needed, Kahneman suggests that System 1 often
takes over in the face of complexity.20
For instance, if asked what you think the president’s
popularity will be six months from now, what system
would you use? Kahneman claims this is a System 2
task since an accurate answer would require a person to
consider the events between present time and six months
in the future that would potentially affect the president’s popularity and render judgment on the likelihood
of these events. Instead of performing these complex
calculations, we rely on System 1 thinking, which would
use the president’s current popularity to gauge what his
popularity will be six months from now.
A similar process unfolds for performance evaluation. To complete the difficult task of assessing someone’s
January-February 2020
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performance, we use shortcuts that rely on information
that is already stored in memory. The benefit of System
1 thinking is that it enables us to rely on intuition to
perform such complex tasks, but the downside is that
this process invites bias. Our System 1 thinking may
succumb to the following five sources of bias when faced
with the complexity of performance evaluation. The
more we are aware of these biases, the better equipped
we are to slow down our System 1 thinking and engage
some System 2 functions to counter these biases.
Halo effects. As the name implies, halo effects occur
when we use performance in one dimension to influence
our evaluation of a person in all other dimensions. The
primary problem of halo effects is that they decrease the
number of opportunities for a person to demonstrate his
proficiency, thereby precluding the rater from evaluating the ratee accurately across different dimensions of
performance.21 Raters are especially susceptible to halo
effects in systems where a single evaluator rates a person
on multiple dimensions—as is the case with our evaluation system and the Army leadership requirements
model with its core competencies and attributes.22
The halo effect can be positive or negative. For
example, an officer who performs well in the attribute of competence by projecting self-confidence and
a commanding presence may enjoy a positive halo
effect across the other competencies and attributes.
Conversely, an officer who shows a lack of self-confidence and commanding presence may suffer a negative
halo effect across the other competencies and attributes.
First impression error. This bias stems from initial impressions, either favorable or unfavorable, that
influence a rater’s evaluation. Similar to halo effects, the
primary problem of initial impression error is that a
rater may suppress or discount subsequent information
about a ratee if it is counter to their initial impression.23
This effect can be especially prevalent when a senior rater rates a large pool of a particular position or rank and
has few interactions with each individual.
Similar to me effect. This bias stems from a tendency
of some raters to judge a person favorably when he or she
resembles the rater along dimensions such as his or her
attitude or background.24 Some recent studies indicate
that the military may be especially susceptible to this bias
in comparison to other professions. A study of Army
War College students found that this population scored
lower on openness than the general U.S. population.25
MILITARY REVIEW
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A characteristic of people with low scores on openness
is that they prefer familiarity over novelty; thus, lower
scores for openness may be associated with less favorable
judgments of ratees who are significantly different than
the raters. Other studies indicate service academy cadets
score lower on innovative cognitive style (which is positively correlated with a willingness to adopt new ideas)
than students at comparable civilian universities, and
those who left the academy after their first year scored
higher on innovation than those who remained.26
A study of the relationship between cognitive ability and promotion/selection found that officers with
significantly higher cognitive abilities had 29 percent
lower odds of selection below the zone (ahead of peers) to
major, 18 percent lower odds for selection below the zone
to lieutenant colonel, and 32 percent lower odds for selection to battalion command.27 One explanation for these
results is that officers with high cognitive abilities may
make “worse” junior officers since they may be less likely
to be hypercompliant in comparison to those of average
or lower cognitive ability. By this reasoning, the “similar to
me effect” may contribute to these results.
Central tendency error. The central tendency error
occurs when raters score most ratees as average or slightly above average.28 Although there are four blocks on the
officer evaluation report, raters rarely use the “qualified”
or “not qualified” box. While there are consequences for
a rater to “bust their profile” by scoring too many officers
as “most qualified,” there are no consequences for placing
too many officers in the “highly qualified” category.
In situations where there are no consequences for
too many average ratings, there is a greater potential
for ratings inflation.29 Qualified or not qualified ratings
involve additional work for the rater in terms of greater
potential for interpersonal conflict with the ratee or the
requirement for performance counseling documents if
the rated officer appeals the evaluation. Since no consequences exist for establishing gradations in the quality
of performance for those who are not “most qualified,” it
is easier to rate someone as “highly qualified” than to use
the lower two rankings. While our professional ethos is
a check against this bias, we include it in this discussion
since the potential exists for this bias.
Duration neglect. The essence of duration
neglect is the tendency to place greater emphasis
on peak time periods and recency when recalling
events. To illustrate this effect, Kahneman discussed
97

a study of how patients recalled a colonoscopy.
While the duration of the procedure had no effect
on the patients’ ratings of total pain, the average level
of pain at the worst moment of the procedure and at
the end of the procedure were strong predictors of
the overall evaluation of pain.
Hopefully, pain is not an emotion that raters recall
during an evaluation, but the general principle applies
for how this bias may influence evaluations. Instead of
engaging System 2 processes to consider the performance
of a ratee over a series of events, it is easier to use a key
event such as an inspection, a training exercise, or the
most recent training event to shape the impression a
senior rater wishes to convey in an evaluation.

Addressing Cognitive Biases
We suggest three ways to counter these cognitive
biases. Reading this article and becoming aware of countering sources of cognitive bias is the first step. While we
hope that readers will find this information helpful, we
think it is especially important to include education on
these biases as part of professional military education.
While professional military education courses often
cover board processes and trends, they do not currently
include training on these biases. We think that just as future battalion and brigade commanders receive training
on managing their profile, they should receive training
on rater biases to become better evaluators.
Second, since the source of these biases is a system
that relies on evaluations by a single rater, we recommend that raters seek input from different sources
to help form their judgment of a ratee. One of the
authors has experience with this technique while
serving as a battalion executive officer. The battalion
commander asked the operations officer, command
sergeant major, senior chief warrant officer, and
the author to rank the six company commanders.

After submitting the feedback, the author compared
his recommendations with those of the operations
officer and found that his ratings were the opposite
for the six commanders. While differences of opinion
will probably not always be this stark, there is value
in raters receiving a diversity of opinions to counter
possible sources of cognitive bias.
Third, frequent feedback to subordinates can
help counter bias, especially if a rater is aware of the
potential biases discussed above. Frequent feedback
can foster agreement on performance standards and
increase acceptance of feedback by subordinates.30
This is an area that many leaders struggle with. In
the 2016 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey
of Army Leadership, over one-third of respondents
reported their supervisors rarely or never took time
to discuss how they were doing with their work and
what they could do to improve their performance.31

Conclusion
In reality, the Army’s performance appraisal
system is a multiyear assessment that is prone to
disparities between senior raters and the profiles
they maintain. As this article demonstrates, there
are structural and cognitive biases that may affect
the rating an officer receives. These biases undermine the meritocratic principles that we seek in our
performance evaluation system. The more that we are
aware of these biases, the better position we will be in
to counter their effects.
Editor's note: We wish to express our appreciation to library
research archivists Russell Rafferty and Elizabeth Dubuisson
of the Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, for their support in locating early versions of Army efficiency reports and references to them in period
official technical manuals.
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